THE GREAT INDIAN DEBATE — DAY 38 Has BJP changed India permanently or is a correction possible?
THE STAKES Last month, the Supreme Court struck down the electoral bonds scheme, calling it unconstitutional. The ruling was a rare rebuke to the BJP-led government, which had defended the scheme as a way to clean up political funding. But the judgment also reignited a larger debate: Has the BJP’s decade in power altered India’s institutions so deeply that even a change in government wouldn’t reverse the shift? Or are these changes reversible—if not by courts, then by voters, civil society, or future administrations? The answer shapes how Indians think about accountability, democracy, and the very idea of a "correction."
THE ARGUMENT FOR: BJP HAS CHANGED INDIA PERMANENTLY
The case for permanence rests on three pillars: institutional capture, cultural hegemony, and structural realignment. First, the BJP has systematically reshaped India’s key institutions—from the Election Commission to the judiciary, investigative agencies, and even the Reserve Bank of India. The erosion of the CBI’s independence, the politicization of central universities, and the use of agencies like the ED to target opposition leaders are not aberrations but part of a deliberate strategy. As political scientist Milan Vaishnav argues, these changes are "sticky"—once an institution’s credibility is compromised, restoring trust takes generations, not election cycles.
Second, the BJP has redefined India’s cultural and ideological baseline. The abrogation of Article 370, the construction of the Ram Mandir, and the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) are not just policies; they are symbols of a new national consensus. Even if the BJP loses power, these decisions have reset the Overton window of acceptable discourse. Opposition parties now avoid criticizing the CAA or Hindu nationalism outright, fearing electoral backlash. As historian Ramachandra Guha notes, "The BJP has made Hindu majoritarianism the default setting of Indian politics."
Third, the BJP has altered India’s economic and geopolitical trajectory. The shift from a welfare-heavy model to a capital-friendly one (e.g., corporate tax cuts, privatization of PSUs) has created new vested interests. The rise of India as a "Vishwaguru" in global forums, the deepening ties with the U.S., and the marginalization of Pakistan in foreign policy are not easily undone. Even if a non-BJP government takes power, it would inherit an economy and a worldview shaped by the BJP’s priorities.
Finally, the BJP’s organizational strength—its cadre-based structure, its control over state governments, and its dominance in Hindi-speaking states—ensures that it remains a permanent pole in Indian politics. The Congress, by contrast, is a shadow of its former self, and regional parties lack a pan-Indian narrative. As political analyst Pratap Bhanu Mehta puts it, "The BJP is not just a party; it is the new default setting of Indian democracy."
THE ARGUMENT AGAINST: A CORRECTION IS POSSIBLE
The case for reversibility hinges on India’s history of resilience, its federal structure, and the limits of the BJP’s project. First, India’s democracy has weathered far graver crises—the Emergency, the Babri Masjid demolition, the Gujarat riots—and bounced back. Institutions like the Supreme Court, the Election Commission, and the media have often self-corrected when pushed too far. The electoral bonds verdict is a recent example: the judiciary reasserted its independence despite the government’s attempts to dilute it. As former Chief Justice U.U. Lalit argued, "The Constitution is not a plaything of the executive."
Second, the BJP’s cultural project is far from hegemonic. Its support is concentrated in the Hindi belt and among urban, upper-caste Hindus. In the south and the northeast, regional parties and local identities remain strong. The BJP’s attempts to impose Hindi, rewrite history textbooks, or enforce a uniform civil code have met with fierce resistance. Tamil Nadu’s rejection of the CAA and West Bengal’s defiance of the NRC show that India’s diversity is a bulwark against permanent change.
Third, the BJP’s economic policies have created new vulnerabilities. The corporate tax cuts have widened inequality, and the privatization of PSUs has alienated workers. The farm laws protests and the backlash against Adani’s dominance suggest that economic discontent could fuel a political correction. As economist Jayati Ghosh notes, "The BJP’s model is unsustainable—it relies on crony capitalism and majoritarianism, both of which are fragile."
Finally, the BJP’s electoral dominance is not irreversible. The party’s vote share in 2019 was just 37%, and its support is concentrated in a few states. The opposition’s recent successes in Karnataka and Telangana show that anti-incumbency can still work. Moreover, the BJP’s reliance on Modi’s charisma is a double-edged sword—without him, the party’s organizational weaknesses could resurface. As political scientist Yogendra Yadav argues, "The BJP is a one-man show. Remove Modi, and the edifice crumbles."
THE HIDDEN DIMENSION: THE DEMOGRAPHIC TIME BOMB
Most debates about the BJP’s permanence ignore a looming demographic shift: India’s youth bulge. By 2030, over 60% of India’s population will be under 35. This generation is more urban, more educated, and more aspirational than its predecessors. It is also less attached to the BJP’s cultural nationalism. Surveys by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) show that young voters are more concerned about jobs, education, and corruption than about mandirs or Pakistan. The BJP’s support among 18-25-year-olds has been declining since 2019.
Moreover, India’s urbanization is accelerating. By 2050, 50% of Indians will live in cities, where identity politics is less potent and economic issues dominate. The BJP’s rural-centric model—built on welfare schemes and cultural appeals—may struggle to retain its relevance in an urbanizing India. As demographer Amitabh Kundu points out, "The BJP’s base is aging. The future belongs to parties that can speak to young, urban Indians."
This demographic shift could force a correction—either by the BJP adapting (as it did in 2014 by focusing on development) or by a new political force emerging. The question is whether the BJP can reinvent itself before the tide turns.
WHERE INDIANS STAND
A 2023 Pew Research survey found that 60% of Indians believe democracy is working well, but only 37% are satisfied with the way it is functioning. The same survey showed that while 55% of Indians support the BJP, 40% oppose it. The divide is stark: 70% of Hindus support the BJP, while 64% of Muslims oppose it. A CSDS-Lokniti poll in 2022 found that 45% of Indians believe the BJP has changed India for the better, while 35% disagree. The rest are unsure.
YOUR VIEW If the BJP’s changes are reversible, what would it take for India’s institutions to regain their independence—and would you trust them if they did?